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Abstract 
 
This paper uses cross-country data compiled immediately after the Fukushima 
nuclear accident to investigate how the experience of such disasters affects the 
perception of the risk of nuclear accidents. Estimation results show that the perceived 
risk of a nuclear accident is positively associated with experiencing technological 
disasters but not with that of natural disasters. 
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1. Introduction 
The devastating earthquake that occurred in Japan on March 11, 2011 was 
followed by a tsunami that ultimately crippled the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power 
plants. These unprecedented disasters drew public attention from around the world. 
Such nuclear disasters are likely to change citizens’ views regarding the environment 
(Berger, 2010.). A G8 Summit was held 2 months after the Japanese disaster, and 
countries agreed to join forces in an effort to promote tighter international standards for 
nuclear safety.  
A number of studies have previously considered perceptions and responses 
regarding low-probability events (Camere and Kunreuther, 1989; Kunreuther and Pauly, 
2004). To experience a natural disaster may influence individual risk beliefs through 
the updating of one’s risk level. From the viewpoint of rational Bayesian learning, one 
would expect perceived risk to increase after experiencing a disaster. The Japanese 
disaster shows that nuclear disaster can be caused not only by human error with regard 
to technology, but also by unexpected natural disasters. Therefore, one’s perception 
regarding the risk of nuclear accidents appears to depend not only the experience of 
technological disasters but also on that of natural disasters. 
It has been argued that people who have experienced a disaster do not 
sufficiently update their perceived level of risk (Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Viscurrsi 
and Zeckhauser 2006). As noted by Zeckhauser (1996, p. 115), ―Neither humans nor 
society deal effectively with information, particularly probabilistic information.‖ Thus, 
the issue of the relationship between the subjective risk of a nuclear accident and 
experiencing natural and technological disasters appears to remain open to discussion. 
The perceptions of citizens’ regarding risk do have an influence on policy concerning 
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disasters (Viscurrsi and Zeckhauser, 2006; Kahn, 2007). Thus, it is worth exploring the 
relationship between them. 
By using cross-country data collected immediately after the disaster in Japan in 
2011, this paper aims to investigate how the experience of a technological disaster 
effects perceptions regarding the subjective risk of a nuclear accident.  
 
2. Data and Model  
Definitions and the descriptive statistics of variables used in this paper are 
presented in Table 1. The countries used in the estimations are listed in the appendix 
(Table A1). Immediately after Japan’s natural disaster, WIN-Gallup International 
(2011) conducted a survey in 47 countries regarding nuclear energy. The survey 
included the following question: ―How high or low is your concern about the possibility 
of a nuclear incident in your country?‖ There were 5 response choices: ―very high‖, 
―high‖, ―medium‖, ―low‖, and ―very low‖. The WIN-Gallup International (2011) survey 
provides the responses for each county. Based on the WIN-Gallup survey data, I 
calculated the rate of respondents that believed there is a high (or very high) possibility 
of a nuclear accident—dependent variable PACCI. In addition, an alternative measure, 
PACCI2, is the rate of those respondents who believe there to be a very high possibility 
of nuclear accident. PACCI (or PACCI2) measures the subjective risk of a nuclear 
accident and is, therefore, used as a dependent variable. A key independent variable is 
the number of technological disasters that have occurred (in the respondent country) 
since 1990 (TDIS), which captures the experience of technological disasters. A cursory 
examination of Figure 1 shows that TDIS is positively associated with PACCI. The 
Fukushima nuclear accident was triggered by an earthquake and tsunami. Hence, the 
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risk of natural disaster appears to be related to the perceived risk of a nuclear accident. 
Therefore, the experience of a natural disaster, a further independent variable, is 
captured by the number of natural disasters that have occurred (in the respondent 
country) since 1990 (NDIS).1 Figure 2 indicates a slightly positive relationship between 
NDIS and PACCI, although the relationship is ambiguous. For a closer examination of 
the relationships, regression estimations were conducted. The estimated function takes 
the following form: 
PACCI (or PACCI2)i = 0 + 1Ln(TDIS)i + 2Ln(NDIS)i + 3Ln(GDP)i + 4Ln(POP)i + 
5Ln(GOVSIZ)i + 6NUCLEi + ei,  
where PACCI (or PACCI2) represents the subjective risk of a nuclear accident in 
country i,  represents regression parameters, and e is an error term. With the 
exception of the key variables explained earlier (TDIS and NDIS), the following control 
variables were included as independent variables. Economic factors were captured by 
population (POP), GDP per capita (GDP), and the size of government (GOVSIZ).2 The 
greater the number of nuclear energy plants in an area, the higher the possibility a 
nuclear accident. The number of nuclear energy plants (NUCLE) is included to control 
for this effect. As can be seen in Table 1, the standard deviations of each independent 
variable are large, thus, heteroscedasticity should be taken into account. To reduce 
heteroscedasticity, each independent variable, with the exception of NUCLE, is in log 
form.3  
It is more likely than not, that nuclear plants are constructed in countries where 
                                                   
1 TDIS and NDIS were obtained from the International Disaster Database 
http://www.emdat.be (accessed April 30, 2011). 
2 The data was sourced from the Penn World Table (PWT 6.3). It is available at 
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/ (accessed 28 March 2011).  
3 NUCLE is 0 in some countries where no nuclear plant exists and therefore cannot be 
expressed as a logarithm. 
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people perceive there to be a low probability of nuclear accidents occurring. The OLS 
estimation results above possibly suffer from endogeneity bias because a reverse 
causality occurs between the dependent variable and independent variable (NUCLE). 
For the purpose of controlling for this bias, instrumental variables were used to conduct 
a GMM 2SLS (Generalized method of moments two-stage least square) estimation.4 
Sufficient land area is required to build nuclear plants. Thus, densely populated 
countries encounter great difficulties in searching for space in which to build nuclear 
plants. Therefore, land area and population density were used as instrumental 
variables in the GMM 2SLS estimations. The data for the instrumental variables were 
sourced from World Development Indicators.5 
 
3. Results 
The estimation results for OLS are exhibited in Table 2. The results with PACCI 
as the dependent variable are presented in columns (1) and (2), and those for PACCI2 
are shown in columns (3) and (4). The results of the GMM 2SLS estimations are shown 
in Table 3. The sample size was only 37 and therefore considered small. Thus, the 
jackknife method was used to calculate the standard error to ensure that the results 
were not spurious. 
In Table 2, the results for Ln(TDIS) yielded the predicted positive signs, and were 
statistically significant in all estimations. The absolute values of Ln(TDIS) were 
approximately 15.4 and 15.1 in the PACCI estimation respectively columns (1) and (2), 
                                                   
4 The GMM estimator allows for heteroscedasticity and brings efficiency gains in the 
presence of heteroscedasticity (Greene 2008, Ch. 15). This is why I used the GMM 2SLS 
rather than the 2SLS model. 
5 The data are available from HP of the World Bank 
http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do (accessed 28 March 2011). 
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and 10.7 and 10.4 for PACCI2 in columns (3) and (4), respectively. These results imply 
that a 1% increase in TDIS increases PACCI by approximately 15%, whereas a 1% 
increase in TDIS increases PACCI2 by about 10%. In contrast, NIDS was not 
statistically significant although NDIS did produce the anticipated positive sign. With 
the exception of POP, the other control variables were not statistically significant in all 
estimations. 
With regard to the GMM 2SLS estimation results exhibited in Table 3, an 
over-identification test was used to test for exogeneity in the instrumental variables. 
Test statistics were not significant in columns (1) and (2) and, therefore, do not reject 
the null hypothesis that the instrumental variables are uncorrelated with the error 
term. This suggests that the instrumental variables are valid. TDIS continued to yield a 
positive sign and be statistically significant in columns (1) and (2). Its absolute values 
were 14.1 for PACCI and 9.62 for PACCI2, which are similar to those shown in Table 2. 
On the whole, the estimation results for TDIS did not change after controlling for 
endogeneity bias. Thus, from the results of Tables 2 and 3, I propose that the experience 
of a technological disaster increases the perceived risk of a nuclear accident.  
 
4. Conclusions 
WIN-Gallup International conducted a cross-country survey on views regarding 
nuclear energy immediately after the Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan. Using this 
data, the present paper explored how the experience of a technological disaster affects 
the perceived risk of nuclear accidents. An analysis of the data has found that the 
experience of a technological disaster increases the perceived risk of a nuclear accident, 
whereas the experience of a natural disaster does not affect perceptions of risk. 
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Figure 1. Association between the experience of technological disasters and the 
perceived risk of nuclear accidents. 
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Figure 2. Association between the experience of natural disasters and the 
perceived risk of nuclear accidents. 
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Table 1  Definition of variables and descriptive statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: PACCI and PACCI2 were obtained from WIN-Gallup International (2011). TDIS and NDIS were sourced from the International 
Disaster Database (http://www.emdat.be accessed April 30, 2011). POP, GDP, and GOVSIZ were sourced from Penn World Table 6.3. 
(http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php accessed April 30, 2011). NUCLE was sourced from the HP of the European Nuclear 
Society (http://www.euronuclear.org/info/npp-ww.htm accessed April 30, 2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Definition Mean Max Min Standard 
deviation 
PACCI Rate of respondents who believe that the possibility of a 
nuclear accident is high (or very high) (%) 
42.0 82 5 21.0 
PACCI2 Rate of respondents who believe that the possibility of a 
nuclear accident is very high (%) 
20.1 48 1 13.7 
TDIS Total number of technological disasters since 1990 81.3 744 2 144.0 
NDIS Total number of natural disasters since 1990 74.7 502 1 109.4 
GDP GDP per capita (million dollars) 1.83 4.55 0.21 1.44 
POP Population (million) 110.9 1321.8 0.3 267.8 
GOVSIZ Government size (Government expenditure/GDP) (%) 16.2 59.6 3.24 9.01 
NUCLE Number of nuclear plants. 8.41 105 0 18.9 
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Table 2  OLS estimation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Values in parentheses are t-statistics calculated by standard errors obtained using the jackknife method. *, **, and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1 % levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) 
Dependent 
variable: 
PACCI 
(2) 
Dependent 
variable: 
PACCI 
(4) 
Dependent 
variable: 
PACCI2 
(5) 
Dependent 
variable: 
PACCI2 
Ln(TDIS) 15.4*** 
(3.04) 
15.1** 
(2.61) 
10.7*** 
(2.81) 
10.4** 
(2.57) 
Ln(NDIS) 6.05 
(1.64) 
7.04 
(1.68) 
1.99 
(0.71) 
2.70 
(0.85) 
Ln(GDP) –3.17 
(–0.76) 
–2.31 
(–0.50) 
–2.17 
(–0.86) 
–1.55 
(–0.56) 
Ln(POP) –16.4*** 
(–3.08) 
–15.8*** 
(–2.75) 
–9.74** 
(–2.42) 
–9.32** 
(–2.14) 
Ln(GOVSIZ) 6.97 
(0.83) 
6.94 
(0.79) 
7.28 
(1.44) 
7.26 
(1.35) 
NUCLE 
 
 –0.10 
(–0.48) 
 –0.07 
(–0.48) 
Constant 
 
149.0** 
(2.42) 
133.2* 
(1.90) 
79.0** 
(2.17) 
67.7 
(1.59) 
Adjusted R2 0.25 0.23 0.30 0.28 
Observations   37   37   37   37 
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Table 3  GMM 2SLS estimation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Values in parentheses are t-statistics calculated by the robust standard errors obtained using the jackknife method. * and ** 
denote significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. Instrumental variables are population density and land size. The 
Sargan test was used for the over-identification test. 
 
 
 (1) 
Dependent 
variable: 
PACCI 
(2) 
Dependent 
variable: 
PACCI2 
Ln(TDIS) 14.1** 
(2.09) 
9.62* 
(1.88) 
Ln(NDIS) 9.17 
(1.36) 
5.13 
(0.91) 
Ln(GDP) –0.48 
(–0.08) 
0.64 
(0.15) 
Ln(POP) –14.3** 
(-2.13) 
–7.91 
(–1.37) 
Ln(GOVSIZ) 7.14 
(0.68) 
6.70 
(1.04) 
NUCLE –0.35 
(–0.60) 
–0.34 
(–0.71) 
Constant 
 
97.2 
(1.01) 
29.6 
(0.39) 
Over-identification  
test 
0.66 
P=0.41 
0.16 
P=0.68 
Adjusted R2 0.26 0.26 
Observations   37   37 
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Appendix. Table A1. List of countries used in the analysis 
With nuclear plants Without nuclear plants 
Belgium  Austria 
Brazil  Azerbaijan 
Bulgaria Bangladesh  
Canada  Bosnia and Herzegovina 
China Cameroon  
Czech Colombia  
Finland Egypt  
Germany Georgia 
India  Greece  
Korea (South) Hong Kong  
Netherlands  Iraq  
Pakistan  Italy  
Romania Kenya  
Russia Macedonia 
South Africa  Morocco  
Spain  Nigeria  
Switzerland Poland 
United States Turkey  
 Vietnam 
Note: As in the countries listed in Table A1, surveys were also conducted in a further 10 respondent countries. The question regarding 
the independent variable concerning ―possibility of nuclear accident‖ was not asked of eight of these countries. Aside from the countries 
without the dependent variable, data regarding the number of technological disasters were not available for two countries. Hence, these 
10 countries were not included in the analysis.  
 
 
